This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. Besley and Coate (1991) have shown that, under certain conditions, universal provision of goods can be redistributive even if financed by a head tax. Such a scheme entails a deadweight loss, however, associated with an "inefficient" quality (or level) of public provision. This paper shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers allows the redistribution to take place with no deadweight loss of this sort. The scheme requires no additional informational assumption on the part of the government. Second, the first-best redistribution will also be possible for an economy with many individual types if the good in question is provided in as many variants as there are poor groups with each variant being combined with a different level of cash transfers. Third, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downwards the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive (relative to the cash value of their net transfers). Fourth, the feasible utility frontier of the economy under the Besley and Coate scheme will have at most one point in common with the first-best frontier and one point with the second-best frontier.
Introduction
In designing redistributive policies, the public sector invariably finds it too difficult or too costly to tell the intended welfare recipients apart from the rest of the population.
The recent literature on the public provision of private goods incorporates this limitation on information gathering into account when determining the efficiency properties of such schemes. The literature points out that in the absence of the required information for targeting benefits, one should devise "self-targeting" mechanisms that induce only the intended recipients to participate with the others opting out. One way to achieve this is by imposing certain costs on the participants (e.g., a low quality product, workfare, timeconsuming application procedures etc) that only the targeted population is prepared to endure. The potential pretenders will find, for a variety of reasons, the costs to be prohibitively high; see, among others, Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) , Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) , and Coate (1991, 1992) . 1 Besley and Coate (1991) has a particularly simple structure. They consider the public provision of an indivisible good which is produced in different variants each embodying a particular quality level. Every person may consume only one variant of this good; they cannot be combined. An example is education, when a person can go to only one type of school. 2 The quality is normal in the sense that people with higher income levels would opt for higher quality variants of the good. They further assume that the publicly-provided good will be financed through a head tax. Redistribution is then achieved as long as only the poor households consume the good. In such a scheme, all transfers, bar one, involve a deadweight loss. The exception arises when the publicly-provided quality level is precisely what the poor would choose for themselves if they received its value in cash. The authors point out that, because of the welfare tax, forms a system of differential lump-sum taxation. It should not then be surprising that the redistribution it achieves is first-best.
We also show that while the first-best conditional cash-cum-in-kind transfer scheme dominates the Besley and Coate's mechanism, it may result in less redistribution in that the maximum attainable welfare for the poor will be lower under it (as compared to the poor's maximal welfare under the Besley and Coate's mechanism). Specifically, we prove that if the maximum incentive compatible quality level under the Besley and Coate's scheme exceeds the efficient quality level (i.e. the level that the poor would choose for themselves if they received the cost of the publicly-provided good in cash), the maximum attainable utility by the poor will necessarily be higher when conditional cash transfers accompany public provision than when they do not. Otherwise, conditional cash transfers may increase as well as decrease the extent of redistribution towards the poor.
Secondly, we show that the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its level under the first-best cash-cum-in-kind transfer scheme. This possibility arises when the redistribution is high enough to encourage the rich persons to participate in the program. Under this circumstance, the downward incentive compatibility constraint for the rich becomes binding, and we have a second-best solution. The maximum attainable welfare in this case will as a rule be higher than its corresponding level under the Besley and Coate mechanism. Observe that, unlike the first-best version, the poor participants will now also be punished as the quality of the indivisible good they receive will be distorted downwards (relative to the cash value of their net transfers). That is, the quality level of the publicly-provided good will be less than the level the poor would purchase for themselves if they were to receive the value of their net transfers in cash. The way that conditional cash transfers help is by slackening the otherwise (i.e. in the absence of cash transfers as in the Besley and Coate's scheme) downward incentive compatibility of the rich, thus allowing further redistribution. Table 1 describes certain features of these programs.
Education and health services are not the only examples of "low quality" goods that developing countries provide publicly for the benefit of their poor. Low quality foodstuff is another example. The government of Tunisia subsidizes the provision of such goods in a way that only the poor households will want to consume them. 6 Another variant of these schemes links public provision of one good to another (rather than linking cash to goods). In Bangladesh and Philippines, for example, school value the in-kind transfers as much as they should) or interdependent utilities (when the recipients' consumption of in-kind transfers directly enters the preferences of others). There are also ethical arguments as in Kelman (1986) who postulates that people have "rights to certain specific things, not to the cash equivalent of things" (p. 59). More recently, Gahvari (1994 Gahvari ( , 1995 , and Cremer and Gahvari (1997), emphasize the role of in-kind transfers, when provided uniformly to everyone, in encouraging labor supply and tax revenues, thus offsetting the impact of distortionary income taxes on labor supply. These papers use the logic of Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) who demonstrated the benefits of quantity constraints in second-best environments. Yet another strand justify in-kind transfers on the basis of Buchanan's Samaritan's dilemma argument. This includes Bruce and Waldman (1991) and Coate (1995) who substitute the government's inability to pre-commit to not providing future benefits or risk insurance, for the non-credibility of parents' threats.
6 Sri Lanka, prior to the 1977 reforms, provided (low-quality) rice rations to everyone. However, not being able to prohibit the resale of the rations, that Program worked very much like a cash transfer program; see Besley and Kanbur (1988 
assume that the government is to provide the second good at the quality level of q for free to whoever wants it. The good will be financed by a lump-sum tax T levied on everyone. Besley and Coate point out that it is never efficient to provide a quality level such that both types want to consume it. Efficiency requires a separating equilibrium:
The poor prefer q to the alternative of buying their most-preferred quality level from the market, while the rich prefer to buy from the market. The following incentive compatibility constraints must be satisfied.
Observe also that as long as only the poor participates in the public provision scheme, 7 Examples include education or housing. Alternatively, one can think of the second good as any other private good which one can buy either from the market at the amount one wants or receive a fixed amount from the government. In the latter case, the good can neither be resold nor topped up. the government's budget constraint is given by
where π l denotes the proportion of the poor in the population. Naturally, π h = 1 − π l denotes the proportion of rich individuals in the total population.
Let Q denote the value of q under the Besley and Coate scheme. Assuming the rich do not participate in the transfer program, the quality of the publicly-provided good must be less than their desired level: Q < q(p, y h −T ). 8 As far as the poor are concerned, the discussion will be simplified by introducing a definition and distinguishing between certain values that Q may take. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the utilities between the poor and the rich when Q = Q * .
8 Assume the contrary: Q ≥ q(p, y h − T ). To have the inequality (2) satisfied, it must be the case that 
Q
The value of Q that maximizes the utility of the poor:
The minimum value of Q that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (1):
The maximum value of Q that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint (2):
The (minimum) value of Q that makes the poor as happy as they would be without the government transfer policy:
Next, observe that while Q * is efficient from the perspective of the poor, it does not result in the maximal utility for them. The point is that Q * would maximize their utility (they would choose it voluntarily) provided that the size of their net transfer is constant.
This is not the case here. The poor receives a net transfer of π h pQ which directly increases with Q. In effect, a one unit increase in Q will cost the poor p − π h p = π l p instead of p (which would be the case if net transfers were constant). It should not then be surprising to find that their utility would increase if Q exceeds Q * . Lemma 1 proves this assertion formally. It also shows the relationships between these and other conceptually interesting values of Q. They are introduced and characterized in Table 1 .
Lemma 1
We have:
(ii) Q max can take values from below Q to above Q.
* with a positive slope, and Q > Q * . Second, observe that Q is defined as the
With u q /u c being decreasing in q, it follows that Q < Q * .
Finally, we have at Q = Q min ,
and at Q = Q,
Clearly, the value of the right-hand side of (4) is less than the value of the right-hand side of (5). Consequently, the left-hand side of (4) will also be smaller than the left-hand side of (5), implying that Q min < Q.
To prove part (ii), first observe that if y h is "very close" to y l , Q max will be "very close" to Q min and one may not even be able to separate the types. Under this circumstance, and given that Q min < Q, we have Q max < Q. Secondly, while Q max increases with y h − y l , Q is independent of y h (although it does depend on the relative size of the rich to the poor in the total population). This means that even if Q is set above Q, it may still be not high enough for the rich to participate in the public provision program.
Then, Q max > Q. Figures are drawn under the assumption that Q < Q max < Q. 9 Observe that the feasible utility frontiers do not cross the 45 degree line: As pointed out by Besley and Coate, the after-transfer utility of the poor can never exceed the after-tax utility of the rich.
The first inequality follows from y l < y h , and the second from (2).
9 Thus, if the downward incentive compatibility of the rich were not binding at F and E , u l (Q) would continue to increase with Q. This is why the DB EF and DB E loci are drawn with negative slopes at F and E .
Observe also that DB EF and DB E are inside the first-best frontier AC. Moreover, DB EF in Figure 1 is just tangent to the first-best frontier point E; this corre- Figure 1) and point E (in Figure 2) correspond to Q max .
First-best cash-cum-in-kind transfers
Consider now enriching the Besley and Coate setup by offering the participants not just q, but a bundle consisting of q plus a cash transfer, t, where t can take both positive
(cash transfer) and negative (lump-sum tax) values. The introduction of t changes the government's budget constraint to
as long as only the poor participate in the public provision scheme. More importantly, it gives the government an additional degree of freedom to provide the poor with their efficient choice of quality. Specifically, introduce N to denote the "net transfer" to a poor individual. Then, for any given choice of N , set q(N ) according to the poor's demand for q at an income level of y l + N ; that is, set
Additionally, set the accompanying cash transfer at
Observe also that to satisfy the government's budget constraint (6), T must be equal
This procedure is depicted in Figure 3 
With these values for q(N ), t(N ) and T (N ), we have
which shows why we have termed N as "net transfer".
The limit of redistribution
At N = 0, a poor individual is offered his optimal choice of q given y l and is taxed its full cost: t(0) = −p q(0) with T (0) = 0. There is thus no redistribution towards the poor and they remain at point B on Figure 1 and Figure 2 . A positive N results in a positive redistribution towards the poor which increases in size with N . The resulting utility of the poor is given by
However, with q(N ) = q p, y l + N being the poor's optimal choice, unlike the Besley and Coate solution, the redistribution takes place on the first-best frontier. Specifically, we will have the loci BG in Figure 1 and BG in Figure 2 . Finally, observe that q(N ), t(N ) and T (N ) increase with the extent of redistribution, N.
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It is plain that there will be a redistribution from the rich to the poor only if the rich prefer not to participate in the public provision scheme. Thus the redistribution is limited by the incentive compatibility constraint of the rich:
As with the Besley and Coate solution, it is the case here that the after-transfer utility of the rich always exceeds the after-transfer utility of the poor: The rich enjoy a utility level equal to or above u y h − T (N ) + t(N ), q(N ) , while the utility of the poor is
The positive sign follows because we also have c l (N ) = y l − T (N ) + t(N ) = y l + N − pq(N ). Thus, with q(N ) = q(p, y l + N ), one also has c l (N ) = c(p, y l + N ) and,
It is not just that the rich will always have a higher utility than the poor. Inequality (10) also sets a limit on the extent of net transfers to the poor. This is attained when (10) is satisfied as an equality. This situation is depicted in Figure 5 where the resulting maximal value of N is denoted by N max F B . The budget line for the rich is drawn net of T (N max F B ), the lump-sum tax to be paid by everyone when N = N max F B . Point M shows the (c, q) bundle the rich will consume if they participate in the cash-cum-transfer program.
Point R, on the other hand, shows the rich's optimal bundle if they do not participate.
The two points lie on the same indifference curve for the rich, when N = N max F B . Observe that, with this amount of net transfers, the conditional cash transfers, t(N max F B ), as drawn in Figure 5 , is negative; but it can also be positive. The corresponding maximal utility level of the poor, u l (N max F B ), is shown by point G in Figure 1 and point G in Figure 2 . 
Comparison with the Besley and Coate solution
At t = 0, the solution to our system is identical to Q * in Besley and Coate. Specifically, from (7)- (8), it follows that at t(N ) = 0, q(N ) = q p, y l + π h pq(N ) , which is the characterization of Q * . The two programs will then entail identical costs as well. To compare the two schemes when t(N ) = 0, consider (7)- (9) 
Definition 2 Define the "Besley-and-Coate-equivalent" cash-cum-in-kind transfer policy as the (t(N ), q(N )) bundle which satisfies equations
Note that we will then also have, from (9),
The corresponding values for q and t are found from (7)- (8) 
Proof. When a poor individual receives, under the Besley and Coate scheme, Q Q * (see Figure 2 for Q < Q * and Figure 1 for Q > Q * ), his marginal rate of substitution between quality and the numeraire at Q will be equal to u q /u c p. On the other hand, if instead he were to receive pQ in cash (while continuing to pay π l pQ in taxes so that his net transfer is π h pQ), he would demand q(
Consequently, in going from receiving Q in kind to receiving pQ in cash and choosing his own q, the poor individual's marginal rate of substitution between quality and the numeraire decreases/remains the same/increases (i.e. his demand for q increases/remains the same/decreases) depending on Q Q * . That is, q(N BC ) = q(p, y l + π h pQ) Q according to Q Q * . The result on t(N BC ) then follows immediately from (8).
In words, Lemma 2 tells us that, assuming a poor individual receives pQ in cash instead of Q in kind while continuing to pay the same lump-sum tax as before, his demand for q will be higher (lower) than Q, if Q is less (more) than efficient. Moreover, if we were to provide him with his demanded value of q, we should levy a further tax on him (give him a cash rebate) to equalize the cost of the program to that under the Besley and Coate scheme.
We 
where T max BC = π l pQ max . Now, with T (N BC ) under conditional cash transfers taking the same value as T BC , the value of the right-hand side of (10) will be equal to that of the right-hand side of (11) . Turning to the left-hand side of (10), it will be less than the left-hand side of (11) when q(N max BC ) = q(p, y l + N max BC ) < Q max (depicted in Figure 1 ) and more than it when q(N Figure 2 ).
Consequently, the policy is feasible in the former case but not in the latter case. 
The following proposition summarizes our main results. 
Proposition 1 Combining public provision with conditional cash transfers allows redistribution to take place on the first-best frontier. Moreover, if

Second-best cash-cum-in-kind-transfers
It is plain that, given any desired level of redistribution, it is preferable to carry it out through the first-best mechanism of the previous section than the Besley and Coate's second-best scheme. However, there is a limit to this type of redistribution (N max F B in our first-best setup). In order to push the redistribution beyond N max F B , however, one must resort to a second-best mechanism. One such scheme is Besley and Coate's which under certain conditions, as specified in Proposition 1, can bring about a higher degree of redistribution than N max F B . This raises the question of specifying the optimal second-best scheme. Interestingly, it will be the case that even when a high degree of desired redistribution calls for using a second-best scheme, conditional cash-cum-inkind-transfers lead to Pareto superior outcomes (over the Besley and Coate's procedure).
To characterize the optimal cash-cum-in-kind-transfers scheme, denote the social weight assigned to the utility of the poor by 0 ≤ γ l ≤ 1 and to the utility of the rich
subject to the government's budget constraint,
and the incentive compatibility constraints of the rich (the "downward" constraint) and the poor (the "upward" constraint),
Specifically, let µ, λ h , and λ l denote the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the government's budget constraint (12) and the incentive compatibility constraints (13)-
Denote the partial derivatives of u j , v j and q j with respect to any of their arguments by a subscript indicating that argument. One can then easily show, from the first-order conditions of this problem, that
13 The Lagrangian expression associated with this problem is written as
The first-order conditions are,
It follows from (15) that if λ h = 0, u l q /u l c = p regardless of the value of λ l . Thus optimal redistribution does not distort the consumption of the poor for a range of values of q that starts from a minimum value at which the poor decide to participate in the program (when λ l > 0 and the incentive compatibility constraint of the poor just binds.) 14 Now, as the value of q increases from its minimum value, the upward incentive constraint slackens and λ l = 0. Moreover, as long as the redistribution to the poor is not high enough to make the incentive compatibility of the rich binding, λ h will also be equal to zero and again u 
As γ l increases the poor's utility level increases along the first-best utility frontier attaining its highest value at the point where the incentive compatibility constraint of the rich starts to bind (point G in Figure 1 and point G in Figure 2 ).
When the redistribution is high and the downward constraint of the rich is binding, the nature of the solution changes. This is characterized by setting λ h > 0 in equation (15) . Recall that the rich who do not participate in the cash-cum-in-kind-transfer scheme find the quality level of q to be less than efficient so that u h q /u h c > p. It then follows from equation (15) that u l q /u l c > p. This suggests a less than efficient provision of q for the poor in the second best.
The intuition for a downward distortion in quality comes from its impact on the rich's incentive compatibility constraint. The lower the quality level, the less inclined the rich will be to participate in the cash-cum-in-kind-transfer scheme and the higher will be the feasible degree of redistribution to the poor (the higher will be the quality level q at which their incentive compatibility constraint becomes binding). 15 14 One can easily show that the two incentive compatibility constraints (13)- (14) cannot bind simultaneously so that λ l > 0 ⇒ λ h = 0. 15 Observe, however, that the downward distortion is with respect to the poor's "implicit income" upon the transfer. That is, they would wish to purchase a good higher in quality than q if they were to receive the income equivalent of their net transfers in cash. As compared to what they may purchase for themselves in the absence of any transfers, the poor may very well be consuming a higher quality level of q. Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the second-best utility feasibility frontier under cashcum-in-kind-transfers. The boundary starts from point G in Figure 1 , and point G in Figure 2 , where redistribution has reached its limit under the first-best cash-cum-inkind-transfer scheme. Recall that these points are attained when γ l reaches its maximum value consistent with a first-best solution. As γ l increases from this point, we will have different second-best solution values for q, t, T, u l and u h (where γ l u l + γ h v h is being maximized and the downward incentive constraint for the rich remains binding). Clearly, u l attains its highest possible value when γ l = 1. This is depicted by point M in Figure 1 and point M in Figure 2 , with GM and G E M each depicting the second-best frontier.
Observe also that because point G in Figure 1 entails a higher value for u l as com- 
Concluding remarks
The redistributive capability of the public sector is determined by the nature of the information that it has. When the government does not know who is poor and who is rich, and has to rely on the information revealed by the people themselves, its ability to redistribute is severely limited. Besley and Coate (1991) have shown that when the rich consume a higher quality variant of an indivisible good and the poor a lower quality variant, a certain degree of redistribution will be possible if the government provides the low quality product to whoever wants it at no charge and finance it with a head tax. The method they propose entail a welfare loss because in general the low quality product is provided at a quality different from the poor's desired level (if they were to get the cash equivalent of the transfer).
This paper has argued that the welfare loss inherent in Besley and Coate's procedure can be avoided, if the desired degree of redistribution is not very "high," by linking the provision of the indivisible good to the payment of a lump-sum tax or the receipt of a rebate. Intuitively, the double provision of cash and in-kind transfers will act as a system of differential lump-sum taxes for the poor and the rich, thus achieving firstbest redistributions. The paper has further shown that even when the desired degree of redistribution is high, the introduction of cash into the Besley and Coate's scheme increases the extent of feasible redistribution within the economy. The second-best version of our procedure entails, of course, a welfare loss. However, this will be less than the welfare loss incurred in the Besley and Coate's scheme for the same amount of redistribution. Moreover, it will achieve a degree of redistribution that exceeds what is possible under the first-best version of our model.
The paper has also presented examples of conditional cash transfer programs that currently exist in a number of developing countries. We do not mean to imply that these programs are organized to achieve efficient redistribution. Indeed, most of them cite not one (i.e. redistribution) but many social objectives. They include, in addition to redistribution, promotion of human capital accumulation among the poor, eliminating child labor practices, and providing a social safety net for the poor; see Rawlings and Rubio (2004) . Some of these programs use means testing to screen the poor; some are offered non-universally, and the self-selection criterion is not the only mechanism used to separate targeted groups from the rest of the population. In certain instances, for example, location is used to choose the targeted municipality. Then a means test (Brazil and Mexico), or a proxy-means test (Nicaragua, Colombia), is used to identify the targeted group within that municipality. 18 Many such program also appear to operate on a belief that the recipients do not "value" the publicly provided goods to the extent that "they should." They then offer cash (rather than spend more on the goods in question) to induce the recipients to consume those goods. This amounts to "distorting" the behavior of the recipients in the direction preferred by the "social planner" (education, health etc.) Consequently, viewed from the prism of "consumers know best," these programs must be classified as "inefficient" and "paternalistic." Even under this assumption, however, enriching the Besley and Coate mechanism to include cash must be efficiency enhancing: The cash component would allow the recipients to achieve a less inefficient allocation for themselves.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that, while our model postulates only two groups of people, the possibility of effecting first-best redistribution through cash-cum-in-kindtransfers carries over to an economy with many poor and many rich groups of people.
To achieve this, the indivisible good must be provided in as many variants as there are poor groups with each variant being combined with a different level of cash transfers.
As long as none of the variants is sufficiently high in quality to attract the rich people, 18 A number of recent empirical papers examine the efficacy of different mechanisms for achieving targeting [e.g., means testing, geographic targeting, demographic targeting, self-selection based on work requirement (public work at low wages), and self-selection based on consumption (food subsidies and cash as in our model)]. They include Alderman and Lindert (1998), Bourguignon et al. each variant can be offered at one of the poor groups' most-preferred quality level (i.e. at the level they would buy for themselves if they were to receive the value of the transfers in cash). 19 On the other hand, if the bundles offered the poor groups are less in variety than the number of the poor groups, one cannot effect first-best redistribution through cash-cum-in-kind-transfers. Only, second-best redistribution will be possible. With n bundles and m groups of poor people, if n < m, at least m − n poor groups cannot get their first-best allocations. 19 Specifically assume there are H groups of peoples with incomes y 1 < y 2 < . . . < y m < y m+1 < . . . < y H , with the first m groups being designated as "poor" and the second H − m groups as rich. By "designated" we mean the number of groups of people the government wishes to redistribute to. Let Nmax denote the value of N > 0 that satisfies the downward incentive compatibility constraint of an individual with income y m+1 , v p, y m+1 − π With all poor groups receiving the same net transfer N , every group will be happiest with his own bundle of (tl, q l ) with q l being the bundle l would buy for himself if he were to receive N in cash. The bundles also satisfy the government's budget constraint, and we have a first-best allocation. Observe also that other first-best allocations will be made feasible by allowing N to vary for different people. Redefine Nmax accordingly, and let 0 < N m < N m−1 < . . . < N 1 < Nmax denote the net transfers to poor groups with incomes y m > y m−1 > . . . > y 1 . One needs to set, for l = 1, 2, . . . , m,
such that u(y l − T + tl, q l ) ≥ u(y l − T + tl−1, q l−1 ).
It is also easy to show that, given the normality of q, if l does not choose the (q l−1 , tl−1) bundle, he will not choose the bundles for groups l − 2, l − 1, . . . , 1 either.
Comparing the maximum attainable utility levels for the poor under the first-best conditional cash transfers (i.e. when N = N • Case (ii), y h = 3: 
